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STARR IS TO CLINTON AS REGULAR
PROSECUTORS ARE TO BLACKS
PAUL BUTLER *
INTRODUCTION
Good morning. I am going to talk about race and crime and
impeachment and Clinton and Starr.
I write about criminal law and race and I do a fair amount of legal
commentary on the subject as well. In the last year I have written and
commented for the popular press on the investigation, impeachment
and trial of President Clinton.' I originally believed that the journalists
who called me to talk about race and crime and then Clinton and Starr
saw my expertise in these two areas as a happy coincidence, which was
the way that I viewed it. Before I joined the academy, I worked in the
Department of Justice as a prosecutor of corrupt government offi-
cials. I worked for the Public Integrity Section, which among other
things makes the preliminary recommendation to the Attorney Gen-
eral about whether she should request appointment of an independent.
prosecutor to investigate allegations of crime covered by the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act.
IL turned out that for most journalists I was a generic criminal law
professor, a telephone number in their Rolodex. Regarding Clinton-
Starr, they asked questions about selective prosecution, the fair use of
prosecutorial discretion and the utility of punishment. What surprised
me is how often when I answered those questions 1 could well have
been talking about Mimi' Americans and the criminal justice process.
I was making many of the same points.
But there was one big difference. When I critiqued unbridled
prosecutorial discretion or the system's love affair with punishment in
the context of race I felt relatively alone. When I suggested that some-
times African Americans might break the law and they should not be
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School, B.A., 1982, Yale University:
J.D., 1986, Harvard Law School. Trig Attorney, 1990-1995, U.S. Department of justice. 1 thank
Joyce Lam and Cary Silverman lOr excellent research assistance,
I See, e.g., David Jackson & Allen Pusey, Starr Facing Daunting Task in Clinton Case, Experts
Say Vital Evidence May Not Develop, DALLAS MORNING News, Feb. 1, 1998, at IA; Burden of Proof
(CNN television broadcast, Feb. 1, 1999); Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast., Feb.
5, 1998); Rivera Live (CNI3C television broadcast, Sept. 7, 1998).
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punished I was the radical oddball. When Mike Wallace did a report
on my scholarship on race and crime on 60 Minutes, he introduced
his report with the words, "What you're about to see is going to
infuriate a lot of you." 2
 When I offered related critiques of the criminal
proCess in the context of Clinton-Starr, however, many people accord-
ing to polls, agreed with me. 3
 Black, white, Asian and Latino—the
majority agreed. Democratic politicians, including House and Senate
members, seemed to agree as well. Now, as a scholar who serves up
liberal to radical critiques of criminal justice, I got very scared when I
heard myself saying things with which most people, including most
whites, were agreeing. I thought. 1 might have veered off track. I
thought of the West African proverb: the poet who is not in trouble
with the king is in trouble with his work.
But in preparing this presentation, I am experiencing a new emo-
tion as a crit: optimism—cautious, guarded, rueful, angry optimism—
hut optimism nonetheless. I think that one valuable lesson that might
emerge from the morass in which Ken Starr and Bill Clinton immersed
the country is a new way for the public, and especially the white
majority, to think about law breaking and punishment. I want to em-
phasize that although this way of thinking is new to many white middle
Americans, it is not especially new to many people of color. And it
obviously has not been embraced by all white people or by the public
generally, and most notably not by the House • Republicans who voted
to impeach the president. But the public response to that vote, and to
Clinton and Starr, is instructive. I will describe that response in a
moment. Here, just let me say that I respect the public's response. It
seems to me to be a careful, nuanced and well-reasoned reaction to
the criminality of the president, the zeal of the prosecutor and the
costs and benefits of prosecution. It is an extraordinary response be-
cause the public, in a wholly different context, is embracing sonie of
the tenets of the racial critiques of the criminal justice system. So, it is
a response that ultimately could have profound implications for the
future of African Americans, and especially those one-third of African-
2
 60 Minutes: Tipping the Scales (CBS television broadcast, Mar. lO, 1996).
3 See, e.g., Dan Bait, Clinton Lauyers Hit Back at Starr; Some Democrats Utge Acceptance of Hill
Rebuke, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1998, at Al (CNN/Gallup poll found that only one in three
Americans believed Clinton should resign or be removed from office, while, according to an ABC
News poll, three in five Americans said they believe Clinton broke the law); Ruth Marcus, 7'o Some
in the Law, Starr's Tactics Show a Lath of Restraint, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1998, at Al (when CBS
poll asked whether Starr was conducting an impartial inquiry or a partisan investigation, only
36% termed his inquiry Impartial" on January 26; this percentage fell to 26% by February 8).
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American young men who find themselves in prison or under the
supervision of criminal courts.'
What are the racial critiques of the criminal justice system? Here
are sonic. The system is u njust because there are too many people of
color—especially black people—in prison.' It is also unfair because the
war on drugs has been selectively prosecuted in the black community,
thereby resulting in a disproportionate number of arrests and incar-
cerations for crimes that blacks do not commit disproportionately!'
American criminal justice is unjust even regarding those crimes that
African Americans may commit disproportionately because it uses pun-
ishment as a response to anti-social or immoral conduct that is caused
by white supremacy. Punishment, the critique suggests, is an inappro-
priate response to conduct bred in an environment in which law
breaking looks like a rational choice.
The racial critique focuses on effects. It considers the costs of law
enforcement in the black community in addition to the benefits. These
effects include the fact that more young black men are in prison than
college.' and that half of prison inmates are black, even though blacks
comprise only 13% of population." The radical enfbrcement of the
criminal law against blacks imposes severe costs. It significantly dimin-
ishes earning potential, disrupts Families and impedes education. In
addition, one in seven black men is legally disenfranchised because of
a criminal record.'"
My thesis is the following: Ken Starr is to Bill Clinton as regular
prosecutors are to African Americans. I will describe why this is so by
discussing three characteristics of criminal justice for African
4 See Pierre Thomas, 1 in 3 Young Black Men in justice System; Criminal Sentencing Policies
Cited in Study, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1995, at A 1 (describing study); see also Rif? Between Blacks,
Mates is Mating at the Heart of America," N VAS I I. PosT, Oct. 17, 1995, at Al3 (transcript of
President Clinton's speech on race relations).
5 See MARC MAUER & TRACY !RILING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND 11 in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER I (1905).
n See id. at 9-10.
7
 See Black Males in College or Behind Bars in the United States, 1980 to 1994, PosTsEcoNnitliv
Enuc. OrPorcruNrry (Postsecondary Educ. Opportunity, Oskaloosa, Iowa), Mar, 1990, at 9 [here-
inafter Black Males]; see also MARC MAUER, 'DIE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND
'TIE CRIMINAL JUSTWE Svs . rEnt; A CROWING NATIONAL. PROBLEM 8 (1090). In 1994, approximately
678,300 black males were incarcerated in state and federal prisons and locals jails, See Black Males,
supra. In the Sallie year, 549,600 black males were enrolled in post-secondary educational insti-
tutions. See id. In 1980, Mere were more young black men (front age 20 to 29) tinder criminal
justice supervision than Mere were black men of all ages en rolled in higher education. SeeMAu ER,
supra,
8 See MAUER & HULING, supra note 5, at 3.
See. Fox Butterfield, Mom in U.S Are in Prisons, Report Says, N.Y. TtmEs, Aug. 10, 1995, at
A14.
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cans: the state's selective prosecution, its abuse of prosecutorial discre-
tion and its zeal for punishment. Interestingly, much of the American
public has been critical of Starr on these three issues.'" I hope to tell
a story about an important moment in American history in order to
advance public understanding of the racial critiques of criminal justice
in the United States.
1. Selective Prosecution
Ken Starr is a special kind of prosecutor. He was appointed
through the Independent Counsel Act. The Act is shortly up for re-
newal and it is not expected to be renewed. If it is, it may be radically
changed." Many people see the Independent Counsel Act as unjust.
Its critics include many congresspersons of both parties. I want to
introduce the critics of the Independent Counsel Act to two kinds of
racial critics of American criminal justice.
First, I will consider the racial critics who focus on race-based
suspicion, which is exemplified by the "driving while black" issue. 12
Then I will describe the views of those who are critical of too much
law enforcement in the black community. This category includes the
critics of the Chicago gang-loitering ordinance the Supreme Court is
considering in Morales." Their chorus is that there are too many black
men in prison.
My co-panelist Katheryn Russell has already addressed the driving
while black issue." This is an issue that gets more attention than most
of the racial critiques because it implicates many people who are
innocent, but who nonetheless are treated suspiciously by the police.
I believe, however, that the most injurious effect of race-based suspi-
cion is its contribution to the disproportionate arrest and incarceration
of guilty African Americans. The law explicitly allows law enforcement.
to focus on black people because they are black. 1 • Race-based stops are
See generally supra note 3.
" See, e.g., Espy Questions Counsel Statute; USDA Ex-Chief Cites $1.5 Million in Bills, "High
Intangible Costs," WASH. PosT, Mar. 14, 1999, at A6; David Johnston & Don Van Natta, Jr, Reno
and Stair Said to Agree on Framework for an Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1999, at A24.
12 See Katheryn K. Russell, Diving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Conse-
quences, in this issue, at 717.
13 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 118 S. Cl. 1510 (1998) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari),
14 See Russell, supra note 12.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 ri.2 (8th CM), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1040 (1992); see also Slate v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975) ("'Pleat a person is observed in
a neighborhood not frequented by persons of his ethnic background is quite often a basis for an
officer's initial suspicion. To attempt by judicial fiat to say he may not do this ignores the practical
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one of the best explanations of why African Americans are dispropor-
tionately arrested and punished for drug offenses, even though they
do not disproportionately use drugs.'" There is an important correla-
tion between looking for things and finding them. lithe police decided
that studying law was suspicious behavior, and, on that basis, conducted
more stops of law students, the number of law students who get busted
for drug offenses and other crimes. would rise appreciably.
The fairness of this relationship between looking for things and
finding them has been raised in the context of the Independent Coun-
sel Act. In Morrison v. Olson, the COurt held, with justice Scalia as the
lone dissenter, that the Independent Counsel Act is constitutional.' 7
In his dissent, Scalia makes a long and remarkable policy argument
against selective prosecution. He quotes with approval a speech given
by Justice Robert_ when he was Attorney General. Remember,
if you can, that Scalia is thinking of elite government officials, Itot black
people.
if the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that
he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he
thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be prose-
cuted. With the law books Filled with a great assortment of
crimes, a prosecutor stands a fitir chance of finding at least a
technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone.
In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commis-
sion of a crime and then looking for the man who has coin-
mined it, it is a question of picking the man and then search-
ing the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin
sonic offense on him. It is in this realm—in which the prose-
cutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to em-
barrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then
aspects of good law enforcement."). In Weaver, the police officer testified that his decision to
detain Weaver relied on several factors. See 966 F.2d at 394. His "number one" factor was !hat the
police "have intelligence information and also past arrest history on two black—all [thick street
gangs front Los Angeles called the Crips and the Bloods," Id. at 399 n.2. The court added that
they "are notorious for transporting cocaine into the Kansas City area from Los Angeles 6w sale"
and that "Most of them are young, ronghly dressed male blacks," Id. The cOurt ruled that
although officers may not constitutionally select suspects on "solely race-based suspicion," race,
when coupled with other factors, may be appropriately considered. See id.
IfiAccording to government statistics, Africa', Americans, who comprise 12% of the popula-
tion, account for only 13% of drug users, yet make up 79% of those incarcerated for drug use.
See Thomas, supra note 4, at Al.
17 487 U.S. 654,659-60 (1988).
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looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of
prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement be-
comes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being
unpopular with the predominant or governing group. 18
So, that's the prominent racial crit Justice Scalia on why the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act is unjust. And I suggest that there is broad public
support for this position that prosecutorial discretion is abused when
Crimes are identified not because somebody has reported a particular
crime, but rather simply because the attention of law enforcement is
directed at that individual.
Now there is an academic response to the racial critique of the
law authorizing race-based suspicion. Remember that I am concerned
less with the innocent victims of those stops than with the guilty victims,
that is, those people whose crimes are uncovered only because of the
race-based stop. The reply given by such scholars as Dan Kahan, Ran-
dall Kennedy and Tracey Meares is that selective prosecution might
not be such a bad thing when the people who are prosecuted are
actually guilty.'`' If guilty blacks are apprehended it does not make sense
to criticize that result from a racial perspective because the black
community is improved when criminals are punished. Prosecution
and punishment of people who break laws are public goods, just as a
city park is a public good. Few would argue that it would be unfair for
the African-American community to have a disproportionate share of
parks. Law enforcement should he considered the same way. This
perspective leads Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan to support the City of
Chicago ordinance at issue in Morales that allows the police to arrest
people for refusing to leave the street when the police tell them to do
so. 2n
The depiction of law enforcement as an invariable public good is
fhcially appealing, but there is a compelling reply. Too much of a good
thing isn't always wonderful. Sometimes it's simply too much. In Mor-
rison, Justice Scalia said that "[t]he notion that every violation of law
should be prosecuted is . . . an attractive one. . [but t]he reality is,
18 See id. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19 See. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRINIE, AND THE LAW 375 (1997) ("111mprisonment is both
a burden and a benefit—a burden for those imprisoned and a good for those whose lives are
bettered by the confinement of criminals who might otherwise prey upon therm"); Dan Al. Kahan
& Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. U. 1153,1162-63
(1098) (arguing that minority communities favor higher levels of law enforcement so as to remove
law breakers front their communities).
2" See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Ciii. LEGAL F. 197.
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however, that it is not an absolutely overriding value."21 He responds
to the argument that prosecution of the guilty is necessarily and inevi-
tably good with a Latin phrase meaning "Let justice be clone, though
the heavens may fall."22 Scalia states that the thoughtful response is to
understand "that the benefits of this legislation are far outweighed by
its harmful effect upon ... the nature of justice received (by potential
targets of Independent. Counsel investigations( . "23 So, my good friend
Justice Scalia assumes criminality, i.c., that there has been a violation
of law, but argues that prosecuting the criminal is not necessarily in
the public interest. There are also other concerns, including the effect
of law enforcement on the group of people who are victims of this
selective enforcement.
The body politic's response to the Starr Investigation has echoed
Scalia's critique of the Independent Counsel Act. As Scalia points out,
this concept of law enforcement as a public good is an especially
attractive proposition when applied to the high ranking officials cov-
ered by the Independent Counsel Act. And yet much of the public
reaction to Starr's charges against Clinton has been "Yes, Clinton is
guilty of violating one or more of the federal criminal laws. But inves-
tigating and prosecuting and impeaching and/or punishing Clinton is
too costly a process for the nation."" This reaction suggests that the
public is engaging in an analysis of the benefit of prosecution and
punishment of a law breaker versus the cost of that law enforcement..
The way to measure this cost is by gauging the effect that prosecution
has on the community.
This type of cost-based analysis is exactly the analysis I suggested
should guide jurors' decisions to nullify in a proposal I made for
race-based jury nullification. According to my proposal, if jurors think
that the cost of law enforcement in a particular case outweighs the
benefit, they should nullify, i.e., acquit even if they think the defendant
is guilty. Why? Because in the African-American community the heav-
ens have been falling, in part as a result of justice being done. To state
the obvious: it cannot be good for any community to have more than
fifty percent of its young men uncler criminal supervision in one year.
This has been the reality for both the District of Columbia and Balti-
more, Maryland. 25 If the present rate of incarceration continues, in
21 487 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22 Id. ("Fiat justitia, ruat eoelum.").
23 Id. at 733.
2'1
	 generally supra note 3.
2r' See NATIONAL GTR, ON INSTS, AND Al;YERNATIVES, HOBBLING A GENERATION: YOUNG AFRI-
CAN AMERICAN MALES IN WASHINGTON, D.C.'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1
(1997).
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eleven years the majority of African-American men under age forty will
be in prison. 26
The public's response to Starr explicitly recognizes the political
nature of the charging decision. It lays the groundwork for a construct
of justice that would not require criminal prosecution as a response to
every instance of law breaking.
2. Prosecutorial Tactics
Professor Angela Davis has written about the relationship between
prosecutorial discretion and the disproportionate incarceration of Af-
rican Americans. 27
 The Supreme Court and lower courts have been
reluctant to limit prosecutorial discretion for constitutional and policy
reasons. Both Armstrong and McCleskey read like odes to discretion at
all costs, even if, as in McCleskey, the risk of unregulated discretion is
people being killed by the government on account of race. 28 Therefore,
confronting this thorny issue has been discouraging to racial critics.
Until Ken Starr. There has been much public criticism of the
tactics that Starr has used to investigate and prove the President's
criminality. Commentators have accused him of bullying Monica Le-
whisky into cooperating with his investigation, permitting his staff to
discourage her from talking to her lawyer, forcing her mother to testify
against her, threatening minor witnesses with investigation and prose-
cution unless they cooperate with him, using the grand jury for discov-
ery and subpoenaing the target of his investigation to testify.29
There is a sense that the prosecutor went too far—that he abused
his discretion in a moral, if not a legal, sense. In the Washington Post,
Mary McGrory, writing about prosecutorial zeal of the House Repub-
licans, said that she keeps thinking of what one witness said to Joe
McCarthy during the infamous hearings of the 1950s. 3" The witness
asked McCarthy, "Have you no sense of decency, sir?" Thus, even if the
Independent Prosecutor's method of investigating and proving crimes
is legal, it is indecent. Interesting remedies haVe been proposed. The
26 See Butterfield, supra !Joie 9, at Al'!.
27 See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13 (1998).
28 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.•279 (1987); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456 (1996).
29 See Peter Baker, Starr Accused of Employing Intimidation, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at A20;
Peter Baker & Amy Goldstein, Lewinsley's Mother Overcome by Emotion Dining Testimony; Nurse
Summoned as Lewis Spends 2nd Day at Grand fury,,WAsH. POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al; William
Glaberson, Tactics Called Abusive by Critics and the Ensnared, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at 31.
:) See Mary McCrory, ISO: Reason, WASH. Pon., Jan. 7, 1999, at A3.
May 19991
	 STARILCLINTON::PROSECUTORS:BLACKS	 7 l 3
most likely remedy, I believe, will be that Congress will fail to re-author-
ize the Independent Counsel Act. Other remedies seek to control, or
limit, the prosecutor's discretion, for example, by capping the amount
of money he could spend on investigating.a sitting president. Congress-
man Joseph McDade, who has been critical of Starr's tactics,'t inserted
an amendment in an omnibus spending bill that actually became law.
McDade's amendment provides that "a prosecutor may not attempt to
influence or color a witness's testimony."" There is a widespread sen-
timent that some limiting principle is needed for prosecutorial discre-
tion.
My colleague Jeff Rosen, writing in the New Yorker, suggests that
the kind of crime being investigated is, itself', a reasonable limiting
principle." Professor Rosen's analysis is especially interesting because
three years ago he authored a well-known criticism of racial critiques
of criminal justice."' When Rosen considers the investigation of the
President for what he calls "low crimes and misdemeanors," however,
he believes Prosecutor Starr has gone too far. His tactics "look uncom-
fortably like legalized blackmail. m Rosen properly blames Clinton for
part of the problem because Clinton's Justice Department policies
resulted in the expansion of prosecutorial power by federalizing a
number of criminal offenses. Rosen wrote his critique of Starr before
the recent Supreme Court case of Knowles v. Iowa was decided, but he
foreshadowed the result. 36 In Knowles, the Court considered whether
Iowa police could search the person and automobile of a person whom
they stopped for traffic infractions. The Iowa police obviously were not
searching for evidence of the traffic offense; they were looking for
evidence of other crimes. Sure enough, the police found drugs on
Knowles. The Court unanimously ruled that such searches violate the
Fourth Amendment. 37 Rosen wrote that zealous techniques might be
"perfectly reasonable when they're applied to murderers or Mafia
dons," but that low crimes do not justify the same kind of zeal "because
31 See Marc Fisher, The Undecideds; Some Meditate, Others Surf,  Golf or Agonize Publicly, but
Time Is Thinning Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1998, at Al.
32 See. H.R. 4726, 105th Cong. § 821(0) (6) (1998) ("Hit shall he punishable conduct for any
Department ofinstice employee to ... attenipt to influence or color ;t winless' testimony.").
33 See. iellrey Rosen, Low Crimes and Misdemeanors, New YORKER, Nov. 16, 1998, at 41.
34 SecjetTrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Grits: Of Simpson, Critical Race. Themy, the. Low, and
the Triumph of Color in America, New REPUR ► IC, Pet:. 9, 1990, at '27 (hook review).
37' Rosen, supra note 33, at 42.
4 '119 S. Ct. 484 (1998).
O See id. at 480.
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with enough time and effort, just about anyone can be nailed for a
misdemeanor."'
Thus, even for people unsympathetic to racial critiques of criminal
justice, the Starr investigation has shed light on how prosecutorial
discretion can be abused—even in the prosecution of people who are
guilty. A limiting principle for prosecution of African Americans is
sorely needed. It is what racial critics asked for in Armstrong and
McCleskey and the Racial Justice Act" and what we have yet to receive.
Now at least we have rhetoric to sling back when we get these paeans
to the beauty of unfettered prosecutorial discretion.
3. Punishment
Punishment is the third and' final issue I will discuss in this com-
parison of the critiques of the Clinton investigation with the racial
critiques. Assuming, as almost every one does, that Clinton has violated
some federal law, should lie be punished? if so, how?
First let's pause for a moment to consider the President's youthful
criminal conduct—his possession of marijuana—and how interesting
it is, in light of his support for tough drug laws, that he has never
suggested that he should have been arrested, prosecuted, diverted,
incarcerated or formally punished in any way for that offense.
For many more white drug offenders than black drug offenders
that is the result. The Department ofJustice tells us African Americans
do not use drugs any more than white people, but with respect to
drug-related crimes, thirty-three percent of those arrested, fifty percent
Of those prosecuted and over seventy percent of those incarcerated are
African Americans. 40 My academic writing suggests that this is a prob-
lem and identifies two separate remedies: jury nullification and affir-
mative action:" These remedies have been controversial, in part be-
cause each would result in some guilty people going unpunished. How
38 Rosen, supra note 33, at 47.
39 See Racial Justice Act, H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994). The Racial Justice Act
("RJA") was first proposed in 1988. See H.R. 4442, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). RJA also failed
in subsequent years. See H.R. 2851, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (renamed "Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act of 1991"); S. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1901); H.R. 5269, 101st COng., 1st Sess.
(1990). In both 1990 and 1994, RJA was approved by the U.S. House of Representatives. The
Senate, however, has consistently defeated RJA.
4u See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 592, 606 (1994).
'11 See Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. Cow. L. REV. 841 (1997);
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal fitstice System, 105 YALE
L.J. 677 (1995).
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about that? In the case of Clinton the considered judgment of the
American people is that sometimes guilty people going unpunished is
just fine. Clinton should not be impeached (of course, impeachment
is not technically punishment) or prosecuted for a crime after he leaves
office. It would simply be too much.
Of course, many people—maybe most people—think that a for-
mal reprimand by the Senate or a vote of censure would be an appro-
priate sanction. Clinton might even have to come to the floor of the
Capitol and confess his sins. In other words, Clinton should be shamed.
Thus, in response to Clinton's criminal conduct, a large portion of
Americans embraces the radical possibility of doing nothing—not pun-
ishing Clinton at all, or alternatively, shaming him. It is very utilitar-
ian—Immanuel Kant is undoubtedly spinning in his grave—hut ulti-
inately it is a very grown-up way of thinking about punishment. It is an
analysis that I hope can be applied to black criminals as well as presi-
dential ones.
This view of punishment is important for racial critics because of
the substantial evidence that there are some crimes that African Ameri-
cans commit disproportionately. They do not commit these crimes
because they are African Americans; rather, the best explanation for
disproportionate black criminality is environmental. The clinic is bred
by an environment that can be linked directly to white supremacy. For
some crimes, especially violent ones, I endorse punishment exclusively
for utilitarian justifications. In the case of some other crimes, however,
I do not believe that punishment is the appropriate response. And,
Americans are now apparently ready to accept that not every guilty
person should be subject to state sanctions.
CONCLUSION
Finally, I want to discuss one way in which Starr's relationship to
Clinton differs from that of a regular prosecutor to African Americans.
I stress, however, that the difference is not the relative harm
caused. I find unpersuasive the argument that Clinton's criminality is
less serious than the kinds of offenses for which black people are
incarcerated, especially drug offenses. How does one compare? It is a
debate about proportionality. Remember in Hamelin, where justice
Scalia said, "who knows?"' Certainly, though, there is a strong argu-
ment that the harm caused by Clinton is at least as great as that caused
42 Set! Hamelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985-90 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
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by a drug offender, especially in light of Clinton's status as the nation's
chief law enforcement officer and the way that he mocked the criminal
justice system by lying under oath.
Before I got religion I was a prosecutor, including serving a six-
month stint as a street crime prosecutor. When you do that kind of
work, one of the main things you do is a lot of allocutions in sentencing
hearings about why a particular black or Hispanic person should he
put in prison. 4"AlthoUgh I often worked up a good prosecutor's froth,
I rarely was as frothy as Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde
about what Clinton's perjury had done, or could or would do, to the
rule of law. He and his colleagues, even more than Starr, made a good
case as to the injury that Bill Clinton caused. To me, what Clinton did
is not nearly as victimless a crime as using drugs or even selling drugs
to adult buyers.
The most obvious point of departure, however; between Bill Clin-
ton and African Americans is that Clinton is a white man. In fact, he
is the most powerful white man in the world. And, I am comparing
him to people whom the criminal law usually constructs as niggers.
The truth may be that the majority does not object to the criminal
justice system treating black criminal suspects like niggers. It only takes
offense at the idea of treating the President of the United States like
a nigger. But that's a cynical point of view. 1 have intended for this
presentation to he a willfully optimistic interpretation of Americans'
disgust with the investigation and prosecution of the President. The
public's reaction provides us racial critics with rhetoric and precedent
for making our arguments. To the extent that we believe that a good
argument—or public understanding of our arguments—is what has
been standing in the way of improving criminal justice, our hand is
strengthened. I hope that we can use the widespread public disgust
with Ken Starr and the House of Representatives vs. Bill Clinton to
focus attention on the equally threatening cases of the United States
of America vs. African Americans.
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 For a description of a typical allocution in a drug case, see Paul Buller, Urotherman:
Reflections of a Reformed Prosecutor, in THE DARDEN DILEMMA 1-3 (Ellis Lose ed., 1997).
